Australian Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 47, No. 3, September 2012, pp. 377–397

Patterns of Immigrant Political Behaviour in Australia: An Analysis of Immigrant Voting in Ethnic Context

JOSHUA N. ZINGHER

Binghamton University, State University of New York

M. STEEN THOMAS

Binghamton University, State University of New York

Immigration is becoming an increasingly important issue in virtually every Western democracy. However, immigrants' participation in politics varies greatly from country to country. This article identifies and explains the two key determinants of this variation. We establish that ethnicity along with traditional socioeconomic factors are the two primary forces that determine immigrant political behaviour. We theorise that immigrants' ethnic differences from the native population, along indicators such as language and residential segregation, increase information costs and create barriers to participation in politics as well as influencing partisanship. To empirically evaluate our claims, we analyse data from the Australian Election Study from 1993 to 2010. The results of the analysis in this article provide strong empirical support for our hypotheses.

Keywords: ethnic politics; immigration; partisanship; political socialisation; voting behaviour

This article extends the study of immigrant political behaviour by analysing immigrant political interest and partisanship, differentiating by immigrant origin. We test our arguments in Australia, a country that provides a large and diverse pool of immigrants. Several studies examining immigrant involvement

Joshua N. Zingher is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Binghamton University. His work currently focuses on the comparative political behaviour of immigrants and other minority groups as well as the effects of descriptive representation on political partisanship. M. Steen Thomas is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Binghamton University. His work currently focuses on the sources of institutional change as well as examining the role that political institutions play in mitigating ethnic conflict. The authors would like to thank Michael D. McDonald, Olga Shvetsova, Ben Farrer, Dave Clark and Chris Anderson for their helpful advice and comments on this article. The authors would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers, who provided helpful, diligent and thorough feedback along the way.

ISSN 1036-1146 print; ISSN 1363-030X online/12/030377-21 © 2012 Australian Political Studies Association
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2012.704000

in politics focus on voter turnout or the election of candidates of immigrant backgrounds (Bueker 2005; Jacobs, Martiniello and Rea 2002). The focus on candidates of immigrant backgrounds is undoubtedly important, but our contribution is to the study of immigrants as potential electors. We contend that the degree of ethnic difference between immigrant groups and the native population affects political incorporation. The 'immigrant vote' is often treated as monolithic, but we argue that ethnic differences between immigrant groups explain much of the variation in immigrants' voting behaviour. The combination of a large, diverse immigrant population and compulsory voting in Australia makes it an ideal opportunity to test hypotheses from a theory of immigrant political behaviour that emphasises individual characteristics.[1]

The political integration of immigrant groups is a complex process (Chui, Curtis and Lambert 1991; Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Lim, Barry-Goodman and Branham 2006). Following previous scholars studying turnout or the nomination of immigrant political candidates, we limit the scope of our study to a narrow portion of the political incorporation of immigrants. We analyse two dimensions of immigrant political attitudes and behaviour: interest in politics and voting. Immigrants in highly developed countries are not tremendously different from natives in expressed ideological preferences, but their voting is often highly polarised (Saggar 2000). Neither does economic interest fully explain immigrant partisanship: immigrants are more likely to be economically marginalised, but they do not vote solely along economic lines. We find that the ethnic character of immigrant voters exerts a strong influence on the extent of their participation in politics and on their vote choice, even when taking account of other potential explanatory variables. Consistent support for the Labor Party by immigrants of non-English-speaking backgrounds (NESB) in Australia indicates that there are more factors at work in determining immigrant partisanship than their economic status, level of educational attainment and gender.

Australia is an important and appropriate case because the country incorporates the highest percentage of immigrants as citizens of any state in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The large and diverse community of immigrants in Australia provides an excellent environment in which to test explanations of immigrant political attitudes and voting behaviour. The following section of the article discusses several different possible explanations of immigrant partisanship, focusing on how the political interests and voting behaviour of immigrants vary according to measurable ethnic differences. The second section contains an empirical test, where we present and discuss the results of our model. Thirdly, we offer some concluding remarks and indicate directions for future research.

1. Determinants of Immigrant Political Partisanship in Australia

Traditional theories of partisanship regard individual membership in social groupings such as social class, religious affiliation or geographic region as

[1]Two other prominent conceptions are turnout and descriptive representation through the nomination of immigrant candidates. In Australia, mandatory voting makes turnout a non-issue; the election of candidates of immigrant background is an interesting topic, but mass-level partisanship is more appropriate to this article.

being vital for shaping partisanship (Dalton 2008; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Electors in Western democracies frequently vote on the basis of social class, with the working class voting predominately for social-democratic parties and the upper classes voting for liberal centre-right parties. These traditional class cleavages that characterised Western party systems in the 20th century have weakened over time, as shown particularly by the emergence of niche parties. The erosion or decreasing salience of traditional characteristics like social class creates opportunities for ethnicity to become a powerful cleavage when it correlates with inequality and strong feelings of group identity (Dalton 2008).

Immigrants and ethnic minorities in Western democracies consistently vote for social-democratic parties (for the UK, see Messina 1989; Saggar 2000; for Australia, see McAllister and Makkai 1991b). It has been argued that this preference is explained by those groups' relatively low socioeconomic status (Cho, Gimple and Dyck 2006; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Disparities between immigrants and natives are undoubtedly important for shaping political attitudes, but the measures that traditionally explain partisanship do not fully explain the magnitude of immigrants' preference for social-democratic parties (Saggar 2000; Sobolewska 2005). We contend that ethnic differences between immigrants and natives, and critically, between different groups of immigrants, help to explain variations in the level of immigrant political integration. Extensive research has shown that ethnic, linguistic and residential differences among immigrant groups affect broadly conceptualised integration outcomes (Foner and Alba 2008; Röder and Mühlau 2011; Soroka, Banting and Johnston 2004). The question for this article is narrower in focus. We ask how visible ethnic differences between immigrant groups and the native population affect immigrants' levels of political interest and voting behaviour.

We operationalise the political incorporation of immigrants along two dimensions: political interest and partisan voting. The 'immigrant vote' is often considered a unified bloc, but the propensity for immigrants to vote cohesively varies greatly by group. In line with Bueker (2005), we argue that the propensity for ethnic groups to vote along ethnic lines varies across political systems and amongst different ethnic groups within the same state. Specifically, we argue that ethnic differences between immigrant groups and the native population directly influence the level of political interest of immigrants and their propensity to vote as a cohesive bloc.

Ethnicity and Immigrant Voting Behaviour

The typical indicators of socioeconomic status (SES) affect immigrant partisanship, but ethnicity is also a powerful influence. Apart from partisanship, Sobolewska (2005) found that immigrants in the United Kingdom are generally of lower SES status than the majority of the population, but the policy preferences of immigrant voters are generally not dramatically different from the native population. Moreover, immigrants generally do not vote on the basis of an immigrant-specific policy agenda. Immigrants may articulate their views about specific policies as being relevant to their interests as immigrants, but evidence of a distinctive immigrant or ethnic agenda that shapes immigrant

vote choice is lacking. The policy preferences of immigrants are often heterogeneous even on seemingly relevant issues like immigration or bilingual education. Immigrants tend to be poorer than the average citizen, but the policy preferences of immigrants tend not to be dramatically different from the native population when we control for income. Voting, however, remains an important area where immigrants express preferences differently than natives in the same economic class. What explains the propensity of immigrants to vote for social-democratic parties at the observed rate?

One explanation for the proclivity for ethnically distinct minorities to vote as a bloc for social-democratic parties relies on the concept of 'linked fates'. It is possible that a shared history of racial or ethnic disadvantage shapes the voting behaviour of immigrant groups (Sobolewska 2005). The gap between the mainstream policy attitudes of immigrants and immigrants' tendency to vote heavily for Labour in the UK is filled by a collective identity that non-white British immigrants share (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Dawson 1994; see Wolfinger 1965 for a discussion of immigrant partisanship in the US). Despite many South Asian immigrants holding ideologically conservative attitudes on economic or social issues, South Asian Britons vote overwhelmingly for Labour (Saggar 2000). The linked-fates argument contends that an individual's perception of group interest is a more powerful influence on voting behaviour than an individual's specific policy attitudes (Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991). Chong and Kim (2006) provided evidence that individuals who experience discrimination are more likely to place greater importance on ethnic group membership. If ethnic minorities face discrimination, the increased salience of their group identification makes ethnicity more important when it comes to voting (Dawson 1994). The likelihood of experiencing discrimination is greater for some types of immigrants; ethnically distinct persons are more often subject to hostility by the native population (Ford 2011). Cross-nationally, visible minorities are more likely to report having encountered discrimination (André, Dronkers and Fleischmann 2008).

The reactive-ethnicity hypothesis predicts that when ethnic minorities experience discrimination they are more likely to withdraw into their own ethnic group and view political issues in ethnic terms. Diehl and Schnell (2006) found that structural conditions make integration into German society relatively more difficult for Turks than other immigrant groups, and tend to make Turks' ethnic identity more salient and politically relevant. In the Australian case, there is evidence that ethnically distinct immigrant groups are more likely to be the subject of discrimination in terms of access to employment and experience more interpersonal discrimination (Fozdar and Torezani 2008; Hawthorne 2005). Variation in employment opportunities and level of discrimination across immigrant groups often leads to dramatically different integration outcomes (Crul and Doomernik 2003; Foner and Alba 2008; McAllister and Makkai 1992).

Immigrants with distinct ethnic characteristics are more likely to be the subject of native hostility; due to that greater potential for ill-treatment, members of those groups view ethnicity as politically relevant. When ethnic identity is salient, group membership may trump other considerations; consequently, individuals may vote for candidates and parties that better

represent group interest than individual policy preferences. Middle-class members of ethnic minorities are often subjected to the same kind of ethnic or racial discrimination as working-class ethnic minorities, so they may identify primarily as a minority, rather than a member of the middle class (Dawson 1994).

Politicisation of ethnicity may also occur through immigrants' non-random settlement patterns. Where individuals live affects the type of political information they are exposed to, the strength of immigrant-based political organisation in the area and the nature of local party competition (Cho, Gimple and Dyck 2006). Politically active neighbourhoods socialise individuals to become politically active. Immigrant groups in Australia are geographically concentrated, with the potential to foster ethnic kinship and politically mobilise immigrant groups along ethnic lines (Wierzbicki 2004). The geographic concentration of immigrants does not necessarily lead to political mobilisation along ethnic lines, but the potential for political organisations to organise immigrants along ethnic lines exists in these instances (Cho, Gimple and Dyck 2006).

Table 1 provides information on settlement patterns for several groups of interest in this study, with data taken from the 2006 national census. The statistic shown is Moran's *I*, computed from the GeoDA software package (Anselin, Syabri and Kho 2005). The *I* statistic is a comparison of the spatial distribution of some attribute (immigrants) across some geographic unit (postal codes). The formula used to generate Moran's *I* is depicted below:

$$I = \left[\frac{n}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(y_i - \bar{y})^2}\right] \times \left[\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{j=1}^{n}\omega_{ij}(y_i - \bar{y})(y_j - \bar{y})}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{j=1}^{n}\omega_{ij}}\right]$$

With the *I* statistic, we assess the degree to which the proportion of the population belonging to one immigrant group co-varies over contiguous (Queen's case) postal codes. Values of *I* greater than .3 are typically taken to indicate strong spatial autocorrelation (O'Sullivan and Unwin 2010). Table 1

Table 1. Spatial Autocorrelation of Immigrants by National Origin

Country of Birth	I	2001–2010 AES Sample (% of total)	2006 Population (% of total)	Ratio of AES Sample to 2006 Population
UK	.722	667 (8.68)	1,008,494 (5.48)	1.58
New Zealand	.51	118 (1.53)	387,068 (2.1)	0.73
Ireland	.31	24 (.312)	50,017 (.27)	1.16
Lebanon	.722	24 (.312)	74,756 (.406)	0.77
Sri Lanka	.646	24 (.312)	62,162 (.337)	0.93
China	.606	59 (.767)	206,207 (1.12)	0.68
Vietnam	.553	72 (.936)	159,622 (.867)	1.08
India	.533	43 (.559)	146,711 (.797)	0.70
Italy	.553	83 (1.08)	198,930 (.576)	1.88
Germany	.228	61 (.793)	109,901 (1.08)	0.73

Note: The data in this table is taken from the 2001–2010 AES Surveys (column 1) and the 2006 Australian Census (column 2).

shows that immigrants from a variety of nationalities tend to live in distinct communities and this concentration creates the potential for political organisation along ethnic lines. In Australia, settlement patterns of native English-speakers and NESB immigrants are quite different. NESB immigrants tend to be concentrated in traditional Labor constituencies located in major urban centres. On the other hand, immigrants from Britain, New Zealand and Ireland are more likely to be found in politically competitive suburban constituencies and in rural areas (Grimes 1993). There is the possibility that NESB immigrants support Labor because they settle at a high rate in typical Labor strongholds and are socialised as Labor voters through their neighbourhoods.

Experiences of discrimination and residential patterns explain why ethnic minorities are likely to view ethnicity as politically important, but it is unclear how ethnicity translates into political behaviour in the absence of policy differences between parties. However, the policy stances of the Liberal/National Coalition possibly explain why many immigrant groups in Australia vote disproportionately for Labor. In recent elections many accused former Liberal leader and Prime Minister (1996–2007), John Howard, of using immigration and welfare as a wedge issue. Wilson and Turnbull (2001) stated that, 'Howard had started using the term ''Battlers'' before the 1993 election which he targeted as part of a broader ''forgotten majority'' (393). The Coalition's polling picked up a mood of anger in the electorate and how this was tied to the Labor government's association with ''minorities'''. The combination of Labor's generally more favourable policy position and the arguably divisive rhetoric from Coalition may explain why ethnically distinct immigrants favour the Labor Party. There is a body of literature that corroborates the notion that ethnically distinct immigrants in Australia view Labor as more favourable to their interests and indeed Labor has recently been more supportive of 'multicultural' policies that are favoured by immigrants (McAllister 2003; Mughan and Paxton 2006; Wilson 2001). As Saggar (2000) noted in his analysis of minority politics in the UK, it is not clear that social-democratic parties effectively promote their interests, but immigrant groups are often faced with the prospect of electing a Labor candidate or getting no substantive representation whatsoever from other parties.

While recognising the importance of ethnicity in voting behaviour, scholars debate whether it embodies a permanent social cleavage or a temporary point of organisation for people with shared experiences (Saggar 2000). Does the ethnic identity of immigrants serve as a proxy for short-term collective experiences associated with immigration (i.e. where immigrants initially move, means of socialisation, etc.) or does the ethnic identity of immigrants shape their political attitudes over the long term? If ethnicity or immigrant status is a proxy for a shared experience that dissipates in importance over time, we should observe that the explanatory power of these variables decreases with age. A more stable effect of these variables over time indicates a social cleavage as described above. If immigrant preference for Labor is a product of the immigration process we should observe the strong preference for Labor diminish with time spent in Australia. Likewise, if the immigration experience produces immigrants' preference for Labor, we have no reason to expect major differences in party preference between white English-speaking immigrants and

ethnically distinctly immigrant groups, besides what is accounted for by demographic variables.

Another possible explanation for the magnitude of immigrants' support for Labor is a product of pre-migration socialisation. White et al. (2008) provided evidence that suggests that the general predispositions of individuals that predict political interest and partisanship such as ideological bent, age and education are due to early socialisation and transfer from an immigrant's source country to the receiving country. Individuals who were interested in politics prior to emigrating are likely remain interested in politics in their new state (Finifter and Finifter 1989; White et al. 2008). The general political predispositions that affect an individual's interest in politics do not change as a result of migration. However, changing political systems offers a new set of political choices and individuals may translate their predispositions differently. The important question for our analysis is whether immigrants' preference for Labor is a product of prior socialisation or behaviour induced by political conditions in Australia, such as the newfound relevance of their ethnicity. Could different levels or types of political socialisation lead immigrants to vote disproportionately for Labor?

In order to observe the effect of prior socialisation, we include in our estimation the types of political systems from which Australian immigrants come. Nearly all of the white, English-speaking immigrants in Australia come from established democracies, but there is substantial variation in the type of political system from which NESB individuals emigrate. We contend that it is ethnically distinct immigrants' status as ethnically distinct immigrants and not prior socialisation (e.g. immigrants who originated in communist regimes are potentially friendlier to parties on the left) that affects immigrants' propensity to vote for Labor. In order to disentangle these two potential explanations, we include a control variable for level of democracy in the immigrant's sending country in our analysis.

We do not believe that prior experience with democracy will be a substantial influence on immigrant political behaviour, but we do believe that immigrants' propensity to become interested in the politics of their new state varies between groups of immigrants. In Australia, ethnically distinct immigrants tend to show less interest in politics generally and have lower rates of participation than the native-born population (Mackerras and McAllister 1999). This is in spite of the fact that heightened ethnic awareness often increases an individual's interest in politics. We do not dispute this finding; rather we contend that other factors mitigate any effects of heightened ethnic identity in the aggregate. Our explanation for this discrepancy is that language barriers impose high information costs to non-native speakers (Hawthorne 2005; Soto and Merolla 2006) and are an important constraint on access to political information (Finifter and Finifter 1989). The political predispositions that affect an individual's likelihood to become interested in politics do not change when a person migrates to a different country, but how political predispositions are translated into behaviour is affected. We contend that the predispositions that affect individual levels of political interest such as age, education and income will affect all immigrant groups in the same fashion, with older and better educated individuals being more interested in politics, but the overall level of

interest of NESB immigrants will be lower compared to other groups due to the potential language barrier.

Institutional Variation

Differences in measurable characteristics such as country of origin, ethnicity and socioeconomic status should predict political behaviour through the socialisation described above. We also expect institutional variation to impact on vote choice. The lower chamber of the Australian parliament uses the alternative vote, in which voters rank candidates first through last. The use of the alternative vote and single-member districts promotes a two-party system, and Australia has an effective number of 2.03 political parties in the House of Representatives (Cox 1997, 24). Senate elections are held under single transferable vote (STV) rules, in which surplus votes are transferred to secondary candidates if the first preference candidate already has enough votes to guarantee victory. General comparative research has shown that district magnitude and ethnic diversity lead to an increase in the number of political parties (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994), with Australia being no different from the global trend. STV rules combine with larger Senate districts and result in a larger effective number of parties at 2.47 when compared to the lower house (Cox 1997, 25; see Reilly 2001, 17 for more on alternative vote and STV). This variation in institutions is valuable because it allows us to test hypotheses across different voter incentives. We believe that voters are more likely to express sincere, rather than strategic vote choices in House of Representatives elections.

Hypotheses

We expect the tendency of ethnically distinct immigrants is to display *less* interest and participation in politics when compared to native-born Australians. We expect that immigrants from the UK, Ireland and New Zealand will be indistinguishable from native-born Australians in political engagement due to a lack of language barriers. Differences in language and socioeconomic status will create natural barriers to political integration for ethnically distinct immigrants from non-English-speaking, non-European countries. In terms of partisanship, there is evidence that ethnically distinct immigrants vote cohesively when ethnic identity is salient. In the Australian case, the perception of Labor being more sympathetic to the interests of ethnically distinct immigrants should generate group-wide support amongst NESB voters even when controlling for a number of other potential explanatory variables. However, the lack of ethnic differences between native Australians and white English-speaking immigrants leads us to expect that English-speaking immigrants will be indistinguishable from the native population in their partisanship.

Political Interest

> H_1: Immigrants from non-English-speaking, non-Western European countries will express lower levels of political interest even when controlling for traditional demographic predictors.

H_2: Immigrants from the United Kingdom, Ireland or New Zealand will be indistinguishable from native-born Australians.

Vote Choice

H_{3A}: Immigrants from non-English-speaking, non-Western European countries will be more likely to vote for Labor (across electoral institutions).

H_{3B}: Immigrants from the United Kingdom, Ireland or New Zealand will be indistinguishable from native-born Australians.

2. Data, Model Specification and Results

Our data source is the Australian Election Study (AES). It is conducted after every federal election, normally every three years. We make use of seven post-election surveys (Jones et al. 1993, 1996; Bean et al. 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008; McAllister et al. 2012) spanning the years 1993 to 2010. These surveys ask respondents to give information on political attitudes, vote choice, social attitudes, ethnic background and socioeconomic status. Many questions are asked repeatedly but some solicit opinions on specific governments, individuals and salient issues of the day. Because the framework and questions we require remain constant from 1993 to 2010, we collapse these seven surveys into one data set for our analysis.

One important issue with the data that needs to be addressed is the possibility of immigrants being either under-sampled or non-randomly sampled. Marginalised groups are difficult to reliably sample with survey instruments (McAllister and Makkai 1991a). The third and fourth columns of Table 1 display the proportion of respondents by ethnic group in the pooled AES surveys compared to actual size of these populations as reported by the 2006 census. It is important to note that although the possibility for under-sampling or non-representative sampling of immigrants exists, the occurrence of either of these phenomena is likely to bias us against finding our hypothesised relationship. We expect culturally marginalised immigrant groups to be the most likely to have little interest in politics and the most likely to vote along ethnic lines. If this group is under-sampled or if the immigrants in the survey are not representative of immigrants as a whole, we are more likely to commit type-2 errors and falsely fail to reject the null hypothesis.

Dependent Variables

The first model in our analysis uses an index of political interest as the dependent variable. We constructed the index from questions we judged to measure political interest, of which we found six good candidates. From this pool we calculated Goodman and Kruskal's gamma (due to the ordinal structure of responses) to infer which tapped the same underlying dimension. Three were selected and this index was further weighted using principal component factor analysis (factor loadings are shown in Appendix 3).[2] The

[2]The first is general interest in politics, the second is interest in the particular election and the third is whether the respondent cares which party wins. We used factor analysis in choosing weights for each component, which are close to equal for the three.

question posed here is: 'Controlling for traditional demographic characteristics like income, education and age, do immigrants from the subgroups we have identified behave differently than the rest of the Australian population in terms of political interest?' The second portion of our empirical analysis uses self-reported vote choice as the dependent variable. We categorised the choices available to voters in our model as the Liberal/National Coalition (which we make the base category), Labor, the Greens, a minor party or to not vote/spoil ballot.

Independent Variables

To create our primary measure of immigrant background, we divide the sample of immigrants based on country of origin. We divide the Australian population into three groups of interest: native-born citizens act as the base category for comparison; immigrants from the United Kingdom, Ireland or New Zealand; and immigrants from non-English-speaking, non-Western European countries. NESB immigrants are not a distinct ethnic group in their own right, but this variable represents a number of immigrant groups who are ethnically distinct. We argue that the effect of being ethnically distinct should affect all such immigrant groups similarly. Constructing our country-of-origin variable in this fashion allows us to divide the sample in two ways. We divide the sample of immigrants into those who are likely to be ethnically distinct from the native population and those who are not (white, English-speaking immigrants). Our criterion of distinction is whether immigrants come from predominantly English-speaking countries or non-English-speaking countries. We lack information on the level of English-speaking ability of immigrants on the individual level (English-language ability was not a question in the AES survey), but we make broad generalisations about the likelihood that members of specific groups are native English speakers.

In addition, our estimation includes a battery of control variables found in the AES surveys. Our models feature controls for age, gender, years of education, income (measured in $5,000 increments), urban residence and dummy variables to account for variation in electoral conditions in a given election year. Immigrant-specific variables were also created in an effort to isolate the primary factors responsible for shaping immigrant partisanship. We include controls for the number of years an immigrant has lived in Australia and the polity (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) score of their home country (as measured by the combined polity score of their home country in the year 1970 – the score closest to the mean year of immigration for respondents in the sample) to capture experience with democratic politics. These last two variables exist only for 2004 and 2007, when the necessary questions were asked by the AES. Details of the models appear in Appendixes 1 and 2.

Models

In our first model, the dependent variable is an index of political interest, making an ordinary least squares (OLS) an appropriate estimator. All other models use respondents' reported vote choice as the dependent variable. The

elections in question feature multiple parties, making multinomial logit an attractive specification for our analysis.[3] The equation for the multinomial logit model used in our analyses is depicted below:

$$\Pr(\ Y_i = j_{VoteChoice}) = \frac{e^{\beta_j' X_i}}{\sum_{k=0}^{6} e^{\beta_j' X_i}}$$

Results

To test the effect of ethnic differences on immigrant political integration we present two sets of results: the first models political interest and the second, vote choice in the federal parliament. Overall, our analysis of political interest provides support for our hypothesis while exhibiting some variation within subsamples. The results presented in Table 2 are aggregated across survey years, beginning in 1993 and ending in 2010.

The results of the models confirm that when levels of political interest in the samples of NESB immigrants and English-speaking immigrants are compared to a base category of native-born Australians, only NESB immigrants are distinguishable from the native-born population. Immigrants from English-speaking countries are not statistically different from native-born Australians. The results of models 2.1 and 2.2 provide evidence that supports our first and second hypotheses. Controlling for demographics, NESB immigrants are less interested in politics than their English-speaking counterparts. The first portion of our analysis provides evidence that immigrants from non-English-speaking countries are significantly different than the rest of the population: they are less interested in politics. In this analysis, we include a model that controls for level of education and one that does not, due to a non-trivial number of non-responses. The results are consistent across these two specifications.

The next set of models attempts to disentangle some potential explanations for NESB immigrants' disproportionate support of Labor.

The results of the above model are congruent with our expectations. Immigrants from non-English-speaking countries are, *ceteris paribus*, more

[3]There has been debate in the literature as to whether multinomial logit is an appropriate model for capturing vote choice in multiparty elections because the multinomial logit specification assumes that the different choices are independent and irrelevant alternatives. The method assumes that the categories cannot substitute for one another. Clearly, vote choices are substitutable, not independent alternatives, and thereby violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption made by the estimator. One alternative is the multinomial probit model, which does not require the IIA assumption (Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Glasgow 2001). We did not use the multinomial probit (MNP) because it requires information about the parties' positions in policy space in order to assess the substitutability of the choices. Operationalising that information would require some untenable assumptions that make the multinomial logit our preferred specification. By having to make assumptions about where parties fall in policy space, we would be forced to eliminate 'did not vote' and the catchall 'other parties' categories. For the purposes of this study, we contend that the multinomial logit specification is the most appropriate statistical method. The Small–Hsiao test, a commonly used diagnostic for assessing the limitations of the multinomial logit (Long and Freese 2006, 245), does not indicate a problematic violation of the IIA assumption. The results of the Small–Hsiao test for our two primary multinomial logit models appear in Appendix 4.

Table 2. OLS Regression of Political Interest Index

Variables	Model 2.1 – With Education	Model 2.2 – Without Education
Non English	−.163***	−.157***
	(.026)	(.023)
UK/Ire/NZ	−.033	−.02
	(.023)	(.021)
Age	.008***	.009***
	(.000)	(.000)
Urban	.013***	.015***
	(.005)	(.004)
Income	.015***	.021***
	(.002)	(.001)
Female	−.022*	−.036***
	(.014)	(.012)
Education	.027***	
	(.003)	
1993	.252***	.236***
	(.026)	(.022)
1996	.112***	.103***
	(.026)	(.023)
1998	.149***	.141***
	(.024)	(.023)
2001	−.018	−.036
	(.025)	(.022)
2004	.061**	.035
	(.025)	(.023)
2007	.101***	.08***
	(.024)	(.022)
Constant	.752***	.747***
	(.041)	(.037)
N	8,623	11,260
R-squared	.073	.069

Note: This model includes unstandardised coefficients and normal standard errors. 2010 is the base category for the year dummy variables.
*statistical significance at .1 level, two-tailed test; **statistical significance at .05 level, two-tailed test; ***statistical significance at .01 level, two-tailed test.



Figure 1. Multinomial Logit Predicted Probabilities – Lower House Elections.



Figure 2. Multinomial Logit Predicted Probabilities – Senate Elections.

Table 3. Multinomial Logit Regression of Party Choice in Lower House Elections

	Labor	Democrats	Greens	One Nation	Other	Did Not Vote
Non English	.398***	−.432	−.043	−2.049**	−.513	.411
	(.091)	(.297)	(.196)	(1.012)	(.317)	(.349)
UK/Ire/NZ	.194**	.016	.358**	−.501	.242	.149
	(.083)	(.233)	(.158)	(.38)	(.204)	(.365)
Age	−.018***	−.028***	−.037***	−.013**	−.014***	−.041***
	(.002)	(.004)	(.003)	(.006)	(.004)	(.007)
Urban	.096***	.101**	.024	−.19***	−.137***	.123
	(.018)	(.048)	(.037)	(.06)	(.042)	(.08)
Income	−.064***	−.042***	−.051***	−.083***	−.041***	−.108***
	(.006)	(.016)	(.011)	(.024)	(.014)	(.022)
Female	.009	.331***	.250**	−.491**	.066	−.058
	(.048)	(.128)	(.1)	(.193)	(.124)	(.205)
Education	.037***	.118***	.205***	−.015	.095***	−.004
	(.011)	(.027)	(.02)	(.046)	(.026)	(.048)
1993	−.042	18.61	−19.55	−.829	−.406*	−19.57
	(.091)	(1628)	(1263)	(3302)	(.209)	(2813)
1996	−.55***	18.94	−1.998***	−.464	−.789***	−1.7***
	(.094)	(1628)	(.223)	(3409)	(.239)	(.409)
1998	−.395***	19.03	−1.944***	19.47	−.892***	−1.139***
	(.086)	(1628)	(.211)	(2144)	(.231)	(.31)
2001	−.544***	18.9	−1.06***	18.52	−.888***	−1.045***
	(.091)	(1628)	(.16)	(2144)	(.236)	(.32)
2004	−.524***	17.13	−.632***	17.11	−.834***	−.851***
	(.091)	(1628)	(.147)	(2144)	(.237)	(.313)
2007	.042	−.047	−.359**	.013	−.167	−1.145***
	(.086)	(2427)	(.143)	(3178)	(.203)	(.385)
Constant	1.12***	−20.16	.301	−19.12	−.784**	−.225
	(.152)	(1628)	(.287)	(2144)	(.369)	(.555)
N	8,526					

Note: Base Outcome = Voted Liberal/National. This model includes unstandardised coefficients and normal standard errors. 2010 is the base category for the year dummy variables.
*statistical significance at .1 level, two-tailed test; **statistical significance at .05 level, two-tailed test; ***statistical significance at .01 level, two-tailed test.

likely to vote for Labor than the English-speaking immigrant and native-born populations (roughly 20 per cent more likely). Immigrants from English-speaking countries are significantly more likely than the native-born population to support Labor, but the magnitude of the difference is much smaller than the gap between NESB and the native population. This general trend is reinforced when we examine the results of the model of Australian Senate elections, below.

Predictably, Figure 2 and Table 4 indicate that differences in electoral rules between the lower house and Senate elections result in minor parties garnering a larger percentage of the vote in the Senate. Other demographic groups in Australia actively alter their voting patterns in response to the altered electoral rules and cast a higher percentage of their votes for minor parties, but the vote choice of non-English-speaking immigrants remains relatively unaffected. These initial models establish that NESB immigrants are more likely to vote for Labor than English-speaking immigrants and Australian natives, providing strong support for our third and fourth hypotheses.

Table 4. Multinomial Logit Regression of Party Choice in Senate Elections

Variables	Labor	Democrats	Greens	One Nation	Other	Did Not Vote
Non English	.443***	−.122	−.198	−.577	−.328	.483
	(.098)	(.191)	(.173)	(.471)	(.249)	(.39)
UK/Ire/NZ	.067	.326**	.256*	−.128	.084	−.014
	(.09)	(.15)	(.133)	(.29)	(.188)	(.442)
Age	−.019***	−.016***	−.03***	−.003	−.016***	−.042***
	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)	(.006)	(.004)	(.008)
Urban	.07***	.118***	.064**	−.159***	.002	.104
	(.019)	(.035)	(.032)	(.055)	(.039)	(.091)
Income	−.073***	−.034***	−.047***	−.111***	−.048***	−.089***
	(.006)	(.012)	(.009)	(.022)	(.013)	(.024)
Female	−.004	.136	.181**	−.299*	−.061	−.126
	(.052)	(.092)	(.085)	(.173)	(.108)	(.233)
Education	.022*	.142***	.198***	.037	.079***	−.034
	(.012)	(.019)	(.018)	(.04)	(.024)	(.057)
1993	−0.059	19.56	−20.20	−.631	.027	−20.48
	(.097)	(1,607)	(1,428)	(4,332)	(.186)	(4,413)
1996	−.439***	19.73	−2.427***	−.343	−.703***	−20.74
	(.101)	(1,607)	(.224)	(4,628)	(.22)	(5,102)
1998	−.275***	20.15	−2.149***	20.3	−1.022***	−1.487***
	(.093)	(1,607)	(.195)	(2,886)	(.23)	(.367)
2001	−.499***	19.56	−1.141***	19.67	−1.206***	−1.113***
	(.097)	(1,607)	(.139)	(2,886)	(.246)	(.337)
2004	−.468***	18.39	−.621***	18.48	−.398**	−1.044***
	(.098)	(1,607)	(.125)	(2,886)	(.197)	(.343)
2007	.032	.022	−.213*	.071	.348**	−1.23***
	(.094)	(2,387)	(.117)	(4,312)	(.17)	(.404)
Constant	1.285***	−20.84	.394	−20.31	−.823**	−.122
	(.163)	(1,607)	(.251)	(2,886)	(.333)	(.623)
N	8,320					

Notes: Base Outcome = Voted Liberal/National. This model includes unstandardised coefficients and normal standard errors. 2010 is the base category for the year dummy variables.
*statistical significance at .1 level, two-tailed test; **statistical significance at .05 level, two-tailed test; ***statistical significance at .01 level, two-tailed test.

Table 5. Non−English Sub−Sample with Polity2 for Country of Origin

Variables	Liberals or Nationals	Democrats	Greens	One Nation	Other	Did Not Vote
Age	.0213***	−.008	.000	.157	.0302	.026
	(.006)	(.025)	(.013)	(.01)	(.026)	(.021)
Urban	.007	.138	.162	15.10	.062	.515
	(.089)	(.386)	(.196)	(780.6)	(.382)	(.444)
Income	.054***	.082	−.024	−.341	.113	.055
	(.019)	(.077)	(.038)	(.361)	(.077)	(.059)
Female	.011	.726	.158	−1.897	.379	.801
	(.182)	(.672)	(.385)	(2.299)	(.715)	(.623)
Polity[1]	−.006	.008	.006	−.266	.04	.081*
	(.013)	(.045)	(.028)	(.414)	(.051)	(.043)
Pol. Interest	.03	.061	−.01	−.372	−.326	−1.158***
Index	(.127)	(.483)	(.263)	(1.005)	(.480)	(.377)
1993	.082	18.47	−17.89	18.40	.752	−16.20
	(.403)	(4,175)	(2,866)	(4,901)	(1.812)	(3,427)
1996	−.293	.153	−18.53	−.939	−16.38	−17.49
	(.561)	(11.4)	(6,083)	(9,275)	(11,136)	(6,622)
1998	.006	18.39	−2.683**	17.60	1.5	−.157
	(.311)	(4,175)	(1.069)	(3,742)	(1.242)	(.741)
2001	−.061	17.34	−.978*	18.51	1.161	−1.524
	(.318)	(4,175)	(.586)	(3,742)	(1.304)	(1.142)
2004	.515*	.193	−.726	−.029	−16.32	−.786
	(.305)	(5,941)	(.581)	(4,932)	(4,697)	(.896)
2007	−.460	−.253	−.512	−.685	.571	−1.894*
	(.301)	(5,659)	(.476)	(4,890)	(1.254)	(1.12)
Constant	−1.935***	−22.16	−2.008	−103.9	−6.906**	−5.832**
	(.628)	(4,175)	(1.259)	(5,407)	(2.757)	(2.57)
N	634					

Note: Base outcome = Voted Labor. This model includes unstandardised coefficients and normal standard errors. 2010 is the base category for the year dummy variables.
[1]Polity2 from Polity IV v2010.
*statistical significance at .1 level, two-tailed test; **statistical significance at .05 level, two-tailed test; ***statistical significance at .01 level, two-tailed test.

Our next series of models focuses on a subset of respondents, NESB immigrants, in an attempt to test some potential explanations of why these voters disproportionately favour Labor. The following multinomial logit regressions include the same variables as the last two regressions (with the exception of education), but we include the level of political interest and the polity score of an NESB immigrant's home country as independent variables in addition to our previous battery of predictors.

The results shown in Table 5 confirm that political interest does not have a significant effect on the vote choice of NESB immigrants. However, NESB immigrants with a low level of political interest are more likely to not vote or spoil their ballot. The level of democracy of an NESB immigrant's home country is less potent than political interest. The effect of differences in prior democratic socialisation is a potential explanation for the differences in voting behaviour between the two groups, but we do not find support for this hypothesis. The level of democracy in an immigrant's home country makes no substantive impact on NESB immigrants' voting behaviour in Australia.

However, our final model indicates that NESB partisanship evolves as immigrants spend more time in Australia. The number of years immigrants

Table 6. Non-English Sub-Sample with Number of Years of AUS Residence (2004, 2007)

Variables	Liberals or Nationals	Greens	Other	Did Not Vote
Age	−.007	−.046**	.054	.063
	(.012)	(.023)	(.087)	(.048)
Urban	−.002	.181	−.476	12.01
	(.13)	(.314)	(.482)	(684.7)
Income	.037	−.044	.3	.018
	(.031)	(.058)	(.241)	(.11)
Female	−.087	−.086	14.99	−1.152
	(.295)	(.582)	(918)	(1.236)
2004	.908***	−.418	−13.53	1.768
	(.294)	(.637)	(1,008)	(1.201)
# of years in AUS	.026**	.038	.028	−.051
	(.013)	(.028)	(.071)	(.048)
Constant	−1.334	−1.194	−23.03	−66.21
	(.925)	(1.86)	(918.1)	(3,423)
N	234			

Note: Base outcome = Voted Labor. This model includes unstandardised coefficients and normal standard errors. 2007 is the base category for the year dummy variables.
*statistical significance at .1 level, two-tailed test; **statistical significance at .05 level, two-tailed test; ***statistical significance at .01 level, two-tailed test.

spend in Australia is a significant influence on their voting behaviour, as Table 6 illustrates.

NESB immigrants become increasingly likely to vote for the Coalition the longer they live in Australia. It is possible that the experience of immigration contributes to NESB immigrants' support of the Labor Party and the importance of the immigration experience lessens in political relevance. Another potential explanation for this relationship is that ethnicity becomes less relevant as NESB begin to move out of urban immigrant enclaves. Ethnicity is still a significant predictor of vote choice for longstanding NESB immigrants, but there is evidence to suggest that the strength of ethnicity decreases as a political influence over the lifetime of immigrant voters.

3. Conclusions

Overall, these analyses of AES survey data provide empirical support for the importance of ethnic differences in shaping political dispositions and behaviour. The partisanship and level of political interest of NESB immigrants are distinctly different from both English-speaking immigrants and native Australians even after economic indicators and numerous other factors are considered. There is considerable evidence that ethnicity plays a distinct role in determining the voting behaviour of immigrants. It is clear that the ethnicity of immigrants is an important influence on their political orientations and behaviour, but an interesting direction for future research will be to address the role of ethnicity on the second- and third-generation children of immigrants. Our analysis provides evidence that suggests ethnically distinct immigrants' propensity to vote for the Labor Party diminishes the longer the immigrant resides in Australia. However, it is unclear why this relationship exists. A second promising path for future research will be to explore how the relevance

of immigrants' ethnic identity changes over time and how these changes are manifested politically.

Our work here indicates that the ethnicity of immigrants has a separate effect apart from immigrant status. English-speaking immigrants blend into the political system and vote in virtually the same ways as native-born Australians. The quantitative analysis performed here is complemented by anecdotal evidence from elsewhere, establishing that the type of immigrants entering a country matters for how immigrant groups integrate into a state's political system. Limiting the scope of this study to Australia provided the opportunity to use consistent and reliably measured data, which we used to test a number of potential explanations for why NESB immigrants have politically distinct behaviour. Our evidence strongly suggests that ethnically distinct immigrants are likely to behave differently because of the influence of shared experiences of discrimination and the establishment of a collective identity.

References

Alvarez, M.R. and Garcia Bedolla, L. 2003. 'The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 Election'. *Journal of Politics* 65: 31–49.

Alvarez, M.R. and Nagler, M. 1998. 'When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multiparty Elections'. *American Journal of Political Science* 42: 55–96.

Amorim Neto, O. and Cox, G. 1997. 'Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures and Number of Parties'. *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 149–74.

André, S., Dronkers, J. and Fleischmann, F. 2008. 'The Different Levels of Discrimination Experienced by First- and Second-Generation Immigrants from Different Countries of Origin in the Different EU Member States'. RC28 Spring 2008 Conference. 15 May, Florence.

Anselin, L., Syabri, I. and Kho, Y. 2005. 'GeoDa: An Introduction to Spatial Data Analysis'. *Geographical Analysis* 38: 5–22.

Bean, C., Gow, D. and McAllister, I. 1999. *Australian Election Study, 1998*. Canberra: Australian Social Science Data Archive, Australian National University.

Bean, C., Gow, D. and McAllister, I. 2002. *Australian Election Study, 2001*. Canberra: Australian Social Science Data Archive, Australian National University.

Bean, C., McAllister, I., Gibson, R. and Gow, D. 2005. *Australian Election Study, 2004*. Canberra: Australian Social Science Data Archive, Australian National University.

Bean, C., McAllister, I. and Gow, D. 2008. *Australian Election Study, 2007*. Canberra: Australian Social Science Data Archive, Australian National University.

Bueker, C. 2005. 'Political Incorporation among Immigrants from Ten Areas of Origin: The Persistence of Source Country Effects'. *International Migration Review* 39: 103–40.

Cain, B., Kiewiet, R. and Uhlaner, C. 1991. 'The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans'. *American Journal of Political Science* 35: 390–422.

Cho, W.K.T., Gimple, J. and Dyck, J. 2006. 'Residential Concentration, Political Socialization and Voter Turnout'. *Journal of Politics* 68: 156–67.

Chong, D. and Kim, D. 2006. 'The Experiences and Effects and Economic Status among Racial and Ethnic Minorities'. *American Political Science Review* 100: 335–51.

Chui, T.W., Curtis J.E. and Lambert, R.D. 1991. 'Immigrant Background and Political Participation: Examining Generational Patterns'. *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 16: 375–96.

Cox, G. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Crul, M. and Doomernik, J. 2003. 'The Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in the Netherlands: Divergent Trends between and Polarization within the Two Groups'. *International Migration Review* 37: 1039–64.

Dalton, R. 2008. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Dancygier, R. and Saunders, E.N. 2006. 'A New Electorate? Comparing Preferences and Partisanship between Immigrants and Natives'. *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 962–81.

Dawson, M. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Diehl, C. and Schnell, R. 2006. '"Reactive Ethnicity" or "Assimilation"? Statements, Arguments and First Empirical Evidence for Labour Migrants in Germany'. *International Migration Review* 40: 786–816.
Finifter, A. and Finifter, D. 1989. 'Party Identification and Political Adaptation of American Migrants in Australia'. *Journal of Politics* 51: 599–630.
Foner, N. and Alba, R. 2008. 'Immigrant Religion in the US and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?' *International Migration Review* 42: 360–92.
Ford, R. 2011. 'Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration in Britain is Affected by Migrants' Region of Origin'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37: 1017–37.
Fozdar, F. and Torezani, S. 2008. 'Discrimination and Well-Being: Perceptions of Refugees in Western Australia'. *International Migration Review* 42: 30–63.
Glasgow, G. 2001. 'Mixed Logit Models for Multiparty Elections'. *Political Analysis* 9: 116–36.
Grimes, S. 1993. 'Residential Segregation in Australian Cities: A Literature Review'. *International Migration Review* 27: 103–20.
Hawthorne, L. 2005. '"Picking Winners": The Recent Winners of Australia's Skilled Migration Policy'. *International Migration Review* 39: 663–96.
Jacobs, D., Martiniello, M. and Rea, A. 2002. 'Changing Patterns of Political Participation of Citizens of Immigrant Origin in the Brussels Capital Region: The October 2000 Elections'. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 3: 201–21.
Jones, R., McAllister, I., Denemark, D. and Gow, D. 1993. *Australian Election Study, 1993*. Canberra: Australian Social Science Data Archive, Australian National University.
Jones, R., McAllister, I. and Gow, D. 1996. *Australian Election Study, 1996*. Canberra: Australian Social Science Data Archive, Australian National University.
Lim, P.S., Barry-Goodman, S. and Branham, D. 2006. 'Discrimination that Travels: How Ethnicity Affects Party Identification for Southeast Asian Immigrants'. *Social Science Quarterly* 87: 1158–170.
Lipset, S. and Rokkan, S. 1967. 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction'. *In*: S. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: A Cross National Perspective*. New York: The Free Press.
Long, J.S. and Freese, J. 2006. *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
Mackerras, M. and McAllister, I. 1999. 'Compulsory Voting, Party Stability and Electoral Advantage in Australia'. *Electoral Studies* 18: 217–33.
Marshall, M.G. and Jaggers, K. 2002. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2009, Version p4v2010*. College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. URL: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>. Accessed 10 December 2011.
McAllister, I. 2003. 'Border Protection, the 2001 Australian Election and Coalition Victory'. *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38: 445–63.
McAllister, I., Bean, C., Gibson, R.K. and Pietsch, J. 2012. *Australian Election Study, 2010*. Canberra: Australian Social Science Data Archive, Australian National University.
McAllister, I. and Makkai, T. 1991a. 'Correcting for the Underreporting of Drug Use in Opinion Surveys'. *Substance Abuse and Misuse* 26: 945–61.
McAllister, I. and Makkai, T. 1991b. 'The Formation and Development of Party Loyalties: Patterns among Australian Immigrants'. *Journal of Sociology* 27: 195–217.
McAllister, I. and Makkai, T. 1992. 'Resource and Social Learning Theories of Political Participation: Ethnic Patterns in Australia'. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 25: 269–93.
McAllister, I. and Makkai, T. 1993. 'Institutions, Society or Protest? Explaining Invalid Votes in Australian Elections'. *Electoral Studies* 12: 23–40.
Messina, A. 1989. *Race and Party Competition in Britain*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mughan, A. and Paxton, P. 2006. 'Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, Policy Preferences and Populist Party Voting in Australia'. *British Journal of Political Science* 26: 341–58.
Ordeshook, P.C. and Shvetsova, O.V. 1994. 'Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude and the Number of Parties'. *American Journal of Political Science* 38: 100–23.
O'Sullivan, D. and Unwin, D.J. 2010. *Geographic Information Analysis*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
Ramakrishnan, S.K. and Espenshade, T.J. 2001. 'Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States'. *International Migration Review* 35: 870–909.
Reilly, B. 2001. *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Röder, A. and Mühlau, P. 2011. '"Discrimination, Exclusion and Immigrants": Confidence in Public Institutions in Europe'. *European Societies* 13: 535–57.
Saggar, S. 2000. *Race and Representation: Electoral Politics and Ethnic Pluralism in Britain*. New York: Manchester University Press.

Sobolewska, M. 2005. 'Ethnic Agenda: Relevance of Political Attitudes to Party Choice'. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 15: 197–214.
Soroka, S., Banting, K. and Johnston, R. 2004. 'Trust and the Welfare State'. *In*: K. Fiona and R. Johnston, eds. *Diversity, Social Capital and the Welfare State*. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press.
Soto, V.M. and Merolla, J. 2006. 'Vota por tu Futuro: Partisan Mobilization of Latino Voters in the 2000 Presidential Election'. *Political Behaviour* 28: 285–304.
White, S., Nevitte, N., Blais, A., Gidengil, E. and Fournier, P. 2008. 'Political Resocialization of Immigrants: Resistance or Lifelong Learning'. *Political Research Quarterly* 61: 268–81.
Wierzbicki, S. 2004. *Beyond the Immigrant Enclave: Network Change and Assimilation*. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing.
Wilson, S. 2001. 'The Wedge Election: The Battle for Australia's Disaffected Voters'. *Australian Quarterly* 73(5): 8–15.
Wilson, S. and Turnbull, N. 2001. 'Wedge Politics and Welfare Reform in Australia'. *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 47: 384–402.
Wolfinger, R.E. 1965. 'The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting'. *American Political Science Review* 59: 896–908.

Appendix 1: Variable Description and Coding

Variable	Description
Education	Continuous, years of tertiary education, right censored (0, 1, 2… 7, 8, 9+)
Income	Ordinal, gross annual family income, right censored (units of $5,000)
Urban	Ordinal, 1 through 5 (5 being most urbanised)
Age	Continuous, left truncated (18, 19…)
Gende	Dichotomous, 1 for female
UK/IRE/NZ	Dichotomous, 1 for immigrants from United Kingdom, Ireland and NZ
Non-English	Dichotomous, 1 for immigrants from non-English, non-European countries
Political interest	Ordinal, four categories of interest (none, little, some, much)
Election interest	Ordinal, four categories of interest (none, little, some, much)
Care about outcome	Ordinal, three levels of interest (none, not much, a great deal)

Note: All data is taken from the 1993–2010 AES Surveys.

Appendix 2: Summary Statistics

A. Summary Statistics – Full Sample

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max
Female	13,067	.52	.499	0	1
Age	12,558	49.76	16.94	17	100
Education	9,740	2.3	2.36	0	9
Income	11,982	9.09	4.71	1	22
Urban	12,789	3.6	1.51	1	5
	N	Lib/Nat	Labor	Other	Spoiled
Vote Choice – House	12,540	.46	.40	.12	.01
Vote Choice – Senate	12,122	.44	.35	.20	.01

B. Summary Statistics – NESB Immigrants

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max
Non-English Immigrants	1,021				
Female	1,021	.472	.49	0	1
Age	935	48.78	15.14	18	93
Education	771	3.03	2.51	0	9
Income	916	8.84	4.87	1	22
Urban	982	4.03	1.41	1	5
	N	Lib/Nat	Labor	Other	Spoiled
Vote Choice – House	968	.37	.54	.08	.02
Vote Choice – Senate	907	.35	.47	.16	.02

C. Summary Statistics – Immigrants from UK/Ireland/NZ

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max
UK/IRE/NZ	1,193				
Female	1,193	.502	.5	0	1
Age	1,144	57.02	14.54	18	93
Education	955	2.33	2.43	0	9
Income	1,091	9.1	4.99	1	22
Urban	1,159	3.83	1.46	1	5
	N	Lib/Nat	Labor	Other	Spoiled
Vote Choice – House	1,143	.46	.39	.14	.01
Vote Choice – Senate	1,112	.44	.31	.24	.01

Note: All data in this table is taken from the 1993–2010 AES Surveys.

Appendix 3: Factor Loadings for Political Interest Index

	Full Sample (factor loadings)	NESB	UK/IRE/NZ
Interested in politics (Y/N)	0.679	0.639	0.669
Interested in this election (Y/N)	0.675	0.648	0.663
Cares which party wins (Y/N)	0.540	0.557	0.532

Note: All data in this table is taken from the 1993–2010 AES Surveys.

Appendix 4: Small–Hsiao Tests of IIA Assumptions

Small–Hsiao Test of IIA Assumption for Table 3 ($N = 8{,}526$)

Omitted	lnL(full)	lnL(omit)	Chi2	D.F.	P > Chi2	Evidence
Labor	−2,169.11	−2,127.73	82.75	70	0.141	for H_0
Democrat	−4,397.16	−4,364.44	65.42	70	0.632	for H_0
Greens	−4,105.38	−4,068.05	74.66	70	0.329	for H_0
One Nation	−4,704.87	−4,665.81	78.12	70	0.237	for H_0
Other	−4,377.30	−4,339.23	76.15	70	0.287	for H_0
Did not Vote	−4,697.95	−4,661.67	72.55	70	0.394	for H_0

Small–Hsiao Test of IIA Assumption for Table 4 ($N = 8,526$)

Omitted	lnL(full)	lnL(omit)	Chi2	D.F.	P > Chi2	Evidence
Labor	−2,606.22	−2,579.45	53.548	70	0.928	for H_0
Democrat	−4,288.29	−4,262.79	51.001	70	0.957	for H_0
Greens	−4,080.11	−4,052.41	55.398	70	0.899	for H_0
One Nation	−4,839.49	−4,810.13	58.731	70	0.829	for H_0
Other	−4,414.64	−4,387.16	54.950	70	0.906	for H_0
Did not Vote	−4,974.43	−4,945.83	57.219	70	0.864	for H_0