

## Online Appendix

This online appendix contains supplementary details for the article “Explaining the Nomination of Ethnic Minority Candidates: How Party-Level Factors and District-Level Factors Interact”. First, we provide coding details for the dependent variable and key independent variables. Second, we present a series of robustness checks: a preliminary study of Canada, a different specification of the Australian, UK, and US, results using bivariate probit, and a specification from the UK using a lagged dependent variable.

### Coding Details

#### *Australia*

The unit of analysis is the candidate-district-election. Thus, each candidate is a separate observation, and so if a constituency was contested by  $n$  candidates at election  $t$ , then there will be  $n$  rows in the dataset with the same values for constituency and election. The  $n$  here is two because we study the Labor party and the Liberal/National party.

Dependent variable: This is a dichotomous variable coded as 0 if the candidate was born in Australia or a country which was in the European Union at the time of the election or in a country where English is the main official language, and 1 if the candidate was born in a country that fit none of these criteria, or if they had ethnic minority heritage. Particularly for victorious candidates it was possible to use parliamentary biographies, but in other cases it was usually clear from news coverage, personal websites, business websites, or lower-level public office biographies, where a candidate was born. Mentions of ethnic minority heritage included descriptions of the indigenous background of a candidate or a non-white immigrant background. Most candidates with such characteristics were prominently identified in electoral biographies,

new coverage, or in other sources, but in borderline cases we took the balance of the news coverage as an indicator of whether the variable should be coded 0 or 1. For example, although Ed Husic (Labor candidate for Greenway in 2004 and Chifley in 2010) is neither foreign-born nor non-white, he is still coded 1 as an ethnic minority candidate, because the news coverage invariably prominently identified his Muslim identity and his Bosnian background. This is one of the few borderline cases in the dataset – for most observations, the information led to clear and straightforward coding decision. If no information could be found for the candidate, these variables were coded as 0.

Key Independent Variable: We use ‘percentage of immigrants from a non-English speaking country’. This variable ranges from a low of 0.01 (around 1%) in the Tasmanian division of Lyons in 2004, to a high of 0.65 (65%) in the suburban division of Fowler in New South Wales. The mean is around 0.14.

*UK*

Except where noted below, all variables come from the Constituency Level Elections Project (CLEP). The unit of analysis is the candidate-district-election. Thus, each candidate is a separate observation, and so if a constituency was contested by  $n$  candidates at election  $t$ , then there will be  $n$  rows in the dataset with the same values for constituency and election. Also,  $n$  is two here because we only look at Labour and Conservative candidates.

Dependent variable: This variable comes from Norris (2010), who codes candidates of any non-white ethnicity.

Key Independent Variable: We use ‘percent non white’ from most recent UK or Scottish census. This value is calculated by taking one hundred, minus the percent white of the population in the district. This variable ranges from a low of 0.25% in the Scottish island district of Na h-Eileanan an Iar in 2010, to a high of 70% in the London district of East Ham in 2010. The mean is around 8%.

*US*

The unit of analysis is the candidate-district-election. Thus, each candidate is a separate observation, and so if a district was contested by  $n$  candidates at election  $t$ , then there will be  $n$  rows in the dataset with the same values for district and election. The  $n$  here is two because we study the Democratic Party and the Republican Party.

Dependent Variable: We code candidate ethnicity largely from academic and media sources, using the same basic procedure as for Australia. We verify this using Fraga’s (2016) data and find an extremely low number of discrepancies.

Independent Variable: We use census data on non-white percentage, which ranges from a low of 1.72% in Wisconsin’s 7<sup>th</sup> district to a high of 99% in New York’s 16<sup>th</sup> district. The mean is 27%.

## Supplementary Case: Canada

We use data kindly provided by Professor Go Murakami to add the Canadian case below. We have elected to present this additional analysis as an appendix because we only have one year worth of data, so these results should be interpreted with caution. The 2008 federal election saw the Conservative Party, led by then Prime Minister Stephen Harper, win the largest share of the seats in the 338-seat House of Commons (36%) and form a second straight minority government. The election saw the Conservative Party gain 16 seats at expense of the centrist Liberal Party, who lost 18 seats. The social-democratic New Democratic Party (NDP) won an additional 7 seats to increase its total to 37. The Bloc Quebecois, a center-left separatist party based in Quebec, won 49 of the 75 districts in the province.

The visible minority population in Canada is quite diverse. The largest visible minority populations are those of African, Chinese, South Asian, Filipino, and Latin American origins. The candidate nomination procedure is similar to Britain, national level parties are able to parachute candidates into districts (known as ridings). Ethnic minority voters have generally supported parties on the left, but not to the extent that is common in the USA or Great Britain. A possible explanation for this pattern is that the Conservative Party in Canada has devoted special attention to ridings with large minority populations and passing minority friendly legislation (Bird *et al* 2010, p. 27). Therefore, we expect our hypothesis regarding the interaction between district demographics and center-left party responsiveness to hold in Canada but only with minimal magnitude.

The pattern of minority candidate nominations that emerged during the 2008 federal election broadly resembles those seen in Australia and the United Kingdom, as all three parties nominated similar numbers of visible minority candidates. The Liberal Party and New

Democratic Party each nominated 28 visible minority candidates, while the Conservative Party nominated 33. The majority of visible minority candidates were either of South Asian or Chinese origin. The results of the analysis in table A1 below demonstrate that all three of the national Canadian political parties were responsive to district demographics when it come to nominating minority candidates. In fact, the Liberal Party was actually slightly less responsive to district demographics compared to either the Conservative Party or the New Democratic Party. The Conservative Party and the NDP were equally responsive. Overall, the results here suggest that the three primary Canadian political parties are responsive to district demographics.

(Table A1 About Here)

In tables A2 through A4 we present a series of seemingly unrelated probit regressions. These models represent an alternative specification compared to what is presented in the main text. Here, we split the sample and specify two regressions, one for each party, opposed to specifying one regression that features a party dummy and an interaction between this dummy variable and visible minority%. The strength of this model lies in the fact that the error terms of the two equations are allowed to correlate with one another, which is the ‘seemingly unrelated’ component. If there is a statistically significant correlation among the error terms this suggests that both parties’ candidate nominates are being shaped by something systematic that is not incorporated into the models. One possible interpretation of this correlation, should it exist, is that the parties respond to each other’s decision to nominate a minority candidate strategically. This interpretation is strengthened by the findings. There is no correlation between the error terms in the American model, which makes sense given the parties have little control over

candidate selection. However, there is a statistically significant positive correlation between the error terms in the Australian and British models, which suggest the parties' decisions effect one another—when one party nominates a minority candidate in a district the other party becomes more likely to also nominate a minority candidate in that same district.

(Table A2 About Here)

(Table A3 About Here)

(Table A4 About Here)

Models A5, A6, and A7 include the lagged value of the dependent variable (i.e. whether the party ran a minority candidate in the district in the previous election) to control for previous patterns of candidate nominations. The results of these models are highly similar to the models in the main text, which suggests that the results are not meaningfully affected by the pattern of candidate nominations in the previous election.

(Table A5 About Here)

(Table A6 About Here)

(Table A7 About Here)

Table A1: The Determinants of Minority Candidacy in Canada 2008

<i>VARIABLES</i>	
District: Total Visible Minority %	0.073*** (0.013)
Party: Liberal Party Candidate	0.591 (0.544)
Party-In-District: Total Visible Minority %* Liberal Party Candidate	-0.028* (0.016)
Party: New Democratic Party Candidate	0.281 (0.572)
Party-In-District: Total Visible Minority %* NDP Candidate	-0.018 (0.014)
District: Median Income	0.0005 (0.011)
District: Catholic%	-0.003 (0.013)
District: Unemployment%	-0.102 (0.068)
District: College Graduate%	-0.014 (0.065)
District: English Speaking%	-0.003 (0.011)
District: Female % (18+)	-0.220** (0.102)
Party-In-District: Incumbent	-0.553 (0.429)
Party-In-District: Opposition Incumbent	-0.506 (0.337)
Party-In-District: Conservative Vote Share 2006	0.004 (0.011)
Constant	8.847 (5.629)
<i>Variance (District ID)</i>	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	918

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A2: Seemingly Unrelated Probit—American Sample

<i>VARIABLES</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Rho</i>
Total Visible Minority%	0.060*** (0.0054)	0.036*** (0.0054)	
Median Income	-0.0050 (0.0098)	-0.0034 (0.0094)	
HS Graduate%	0.035** (0.017)	0.093*** (0.020)	
Poverty%	0.027 (0.026)	0.028 (0.025)	
Non-English Speaking%	-0.013 (0.011)	0.037*** (0.011)	
Democratic Incumbent	-0.71*** (0.25)	0.47* (0.27)	
Republican Incumbent	-0.13 (0.24)	-1.09*** (0.34)	
Democratic Vote Share	0.014** (0.0058)	-0.017** (0.0072)	
Democratic Vote Share t-1	0.0017 (0.0046)	-0.0053 (0.0056)	
2008	0.11 (0.15)	0.0078 (0.18)	
2010	0.30* (0.17)	0.15 (0.19)	
Constant	-6.61*** (1.67)	-10.0*** (1.91)	-0.03 (0.11)
Observations	1,286	1,286	1,286

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



Table A3: Seemingly Unrelated Probit Models—UK Sample

<i>VARIABLES</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Rho</i>
Total Visible Minority %	0.031*** (0.0047)	0.037*** (0.0053)	
Low SES%	-0.020 (0.043)	0.042 (0.046)	
Low Education%	0.034*** (0.011)	0.015 (0.011)	
Labour Incumbent	0.024 (0.30)	0.22 (0.31)	
Conservative Incumbent	-0.077 (0.28)	0.56** (0.22)	
Labour Vote Share	0.71 (0.75)	-2.06** (0.84)	
Labour Vote Share t-1	-0.30 (0.37)	-0.60* (0.36)	
2005	0.67*** (0.18)	0.11 (0.16)	
2010	1.10*** (0.29)	0.071 (0.25)	
Constant	-3.75*** (0.45)	-2.00*** (0.39)	0.41*** (0.11)
Observations	1,627	1,627	1,627

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A4: Seemingly Unrelated Probit—Australian Sample

<i>VARIABLES</i>	<i>Labor Candidates</i>	<i>Lib-Nat Candidates</i>	<i>Rho</i>
Total Visible Minority %	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.011)	
Unemployment %	-0.073 (0.10)	0.020 (0.091)	
Labor Incumbent	-0.090 (0.45)	-0.030 (0.38)	
Lib-Nat Incumbent	-0.25 (0.45)	-5.45 (16,224)	
Labor Vote Share	-0.022 (0.024)	0.038 (0.025)	
Labor Vote Share t-1	0.022 (0.016)	-0.0043 (0.019)	
2007	-0.26 (0.40)	0.20 (0.40)	
2010	-0.27 (0.32)	0.58 (0.45)	
Constant	-1.82** (0.88)	-3.45*** (0.88)	0.49* (0.25)
Observations	401	401	401

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A5: The Determinants of Minority Candidacy in the UK 2001-2010 with Lagged DV

<i>VARIABLES</i>	
Party-In-District: Minority Candidate <i>t</i> -1	1.020*** (0.011)
District: Total Visible Minority %	0.063*** (0.011)
Party: Labour Party	1.565*** (0.578)
Party-In-District: Total Visible Minority %* Labour Party	0.019* (0.012)
District: Low SES%	-0.019 (0.012)
District: Low Education%	0.045** (0.019)
Party-In-District: Incumbent	-0.804* (0.466)
Party-In-District: Incumbent * Labour Party	-1.001 (0.628)
Party-In-District: Vote Share <i>t</i> -1	1.213 (1.064)
Party-In-District: Vote Share <i>t</i> -1 * Labour Party	-2.679* (1.473)
2005	0.973*** (0.260)
2010	1.335*** (0.429)
Party-In-District: Minority Candidate <i>t</i> -1	1.020*** (0.011)
Constant	-6.711*** (0.828)
Observations	3,304

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A6: The Determinants of Minority Candidacy in the US 2008-2010 with Lagged DV

<i>VARIABLES</i>	
District: Total Visible Minority %	-1.52* (0.89)
Party: Democratic Party	0.048*** (0.010)
Party-In-District: Democratic Party * Total Visible Minority %	0.032*** (0.012)
District: Median Income	-0.0075 (0.018)
District: H.S. Grad%	0.066** (0.032)
District: Poverty%	0.034 (0.045)
District: Non-English Speaking%	0.013 (0.020)
Party-In-District: Incumbent	-1.50** (0.68)
Party-In-District: Democratic Party * Incumbent	0.72 (0.85)
Party-In-District: Vote Share <i>t</i> -1	-0.0084 (0.011)
Party-In-District: Democratic Party * Vote Share <i>t</i> -1	0.018 (0.015)
2010	0.34 (0.23)
Party-In-District: Minority Candidate <i>t</i> -1	2.76*** (0.26)
Constant	-9.90*** (3.09)
Observations	1,740

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A6: The Determinants of Minority Candidacy in Australia 2007-2010 with Lagged DV

<i>VARIABLES</i>	
District: Total Visible Minority %	0.06* (0.03)
Party: Labor Party	-1.23 (2.96)
Party-In-District: Total Visible Minority %* Labor Party	0.01 (0.05)
District: Unemployment%	0.15 (0.19)
District: Labor Incumbent	0.97 (0.91)
Party-In-District: Labor Party * Labor Incumbent	-1.65 (1.51)
District: Labor Vote Share <i>t</i> -1	0.02 (0.06)
Party-In-District: Labor Party * Labor Vote Share <i>t</i> -1	0.03 (0.08)
2007	-0.25 (0.54)
Party-In-District: Minority Candidate <i>t</i> -1	2.97*** (0.78)
Constant	-6.47*** (2.07)
Observations	548

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1